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I. The Source of the Climate Change Problem
Global atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases -
carbon dioxide (C0 2), methane (CH 4), nitrous oxide (N20),
hydrofluorocarbon gases (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and
sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) - have increased considerably in the
last 150 years.' CO2 concentrations have risen from pre-industrial
levels of approximately 280 parts per million (ppm measured in
C0 2-equivalent or CO 2e) 2 to approximately 380 ppm in 2005. 3
ft Brian Murray is the Director for Economic Analysis at the Nicholas Institute for
Environmental Policy Solutions at Duke University. Heather Hosterman is an Associate
in Research at the Nicholas Institute for Environment Policy Solutions at Duke
University. For inclusion in a special issue of the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation, colloquy for The Greenhouse Gas
Marketplace: Commercial Regulation of Climate Change Solutions, a symposium held at
University of North Carolina Law School, November 15, 2008. The authors wish to
thank the symposium organizers, fellow panelists, and participants for stimulating an
excellent discussion and providing helpful feedback.
I Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 2007 - The
Physical Sci. Basis, Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report
of the IPCC 135 (2007) [hereinafter IPCC Group I].
2 U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., OFFICE OF INTEGRATED ANALYSIS
& FORECASTING, EMISSIONS OF GREENHOUSE GASES IN THE U.S. 2005, 98 (2006) (CO 2
equivalent (also referred to as C0 2-equivalent or CO 2e) is "[t]he amount of carbon
dioxide by weight emitted into the atmosphere that would produce the same estimated
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These levels far exceed 180 ppm to 300 ppm, the natural range of
CO2 over the last 650,000 years.4
The 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
Fourth Assessment Report indicates that atmospheric increases in
CO2 concentrations since the industrial era is largely driven by
human activities. 5  Fossil fuel combustion to support electric
power generation, transportation, cement manufacturing, and other
sectors of the global economy are responsible for approximately
75% of human-caused CO 2 emissions. 6  This accounts for7approximately 56.6% of all greenhouse gas emissions. Land use
change, particularly deforestation, is a significant, but lesser
source of emissions (17.3% of greenhouse gas emissions).8
Emissions from CH4 and N20, primarily from agricultural
activities, contribute approximately 14.3% and 7.9% to
greenhouse gas emissions, respectively. 9
radiative forcing as a given weight of another radiatively active gas. Carbon dioxide
equivalents are computed by multiplying the weight of the gas being measured (for
example, methane) by its estimated global warming potential (which is 21 for methane).
'Carbon equivalent units' are defined as carbon dioxide equivalents multiplied by the
carbon content of carbon dioxide." For example, if one ton of a greenhouse gas is
twenty-one times more potent than CO2 (such as methane), then it would be measured as
twenty-one tons CO2e.).
3 IPCC Group I, supra note 1, at 137.
4 Id. at 2; see also id. at 143-44 (Methane (CH 4) has increased from pre-industrial
values of approximately 715 parts per billion (ppb) to approximately 1774 ppb in 2005,
far exceeding the natural range of CI-H (320 ppb to 790 ppb). Observed increases in CH4
are most likely due to anthropogenic activities, particularly agriculture. N20 has
increased from approximately 270 ppm during the pre-industrial era to approximately
320 ppm in 2005, mainly due to agricultural activities. Fluorinated gases, manufactured
by humans, were not present before the industrial era.).
5 IPCC Group I, supra note 1, at 135.
6 Id. at 131 ("[E]missions of fossil fuels and cement production have likely
contributed about three-quarters... with the remainder caused by land use changes.").
7 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), CLIMATE CHANGE
2007 - MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP Ill TO THE
FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE IPCC 137-40 (2007) [hereinafter IPCC GROUP Il1].
8 Id.
9 CO 2 emissions associated with fossil fuel have increased from approximately 6.4
gigatons of carbon (GtC) per year in the 1990s to approximately 7.2 GtC per year in the
years 2000 to 2005 and emissions. See [PCC GROUP 111, supra note 7, at 138
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Source. Adapted from IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, 200710
Rising average surface temperatures are a result of growing
concentrations of greenhouse gases from human activities.11 The
rate of warming over the past fifty years is about twice that of the
last 100 years.12  Warming has also occurred in the oceans;
however, surface air temperatures have increased at a higher rate
than ocean temperatures. 13  This is an increase of 0.27C per
decade for surface air temperatures versus 0.13'C per decade for
ocean temperatures since 1979.14
10 IPCC GROUP III, supra note 7, at 103 (Figure 1.lb Global anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions in 2004).
11 IPCC GROUP I, supra note 1, at 135; see also id. at 465 (Temperature change is
more difficult to assess than greenhouse gas emissions. There is only 150 years of
sufficient data collection on temperature. Previous temperature recordings used proxy
ice core and tree ring data. Temperature also varies regionally, with local climate
conditions affecting the outcome of regional temperature data.).
12 Id. at 137 ("During this period, the absolute growth rate of CO 2 in the
atmosphere increased substantially: the first fifty ppm increase above the pre-industrial
value was reached in the 1970s after more than 200 years, whereas the second fifty ppm
was achieved in about thirty years. In the ten years from 1995 to 2005 atmospheric CO2
increased by about nineteen ppm; the highest average growth rate recorded for any
decade since direct atmospheric CO2 measurements began in the 1950s.").
13 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), CLIMATE CHANGE
2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 2 (2007) [hereinafter IPCC
SYNTHESis REPORT] ("Rising sea level is consistent with warming.").
14 Id. at 6.
2009
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Higher temperatures have numerous global impacts including
shifts in precipitation patterns, melting snow caps and glaciers,
and rising sea levels. 15  Greater warming and precipitation
generally has occurred in the northern latitudes, increasing the
incidence of flooding events. Meanwhile, cooling and drying has
been experienced in the tropics and subtropics, increasing the
intensity of droughts. 16 Glaciers and snow cover have also been
decreasing worldwide. 17 Since the 1920s, and particularly since
the 1970s, snow cover area has decreased in the Northern
Hemisphere during the spring and summer months.' 8 In the last
thirty years, the spring melt has shifted, starting nearly two weeks
earlier. 19  Higher ocean temperatures, which cause thermal
expansion, as well as widespread melting of glacial and ice sheets,
have contributed to a rise in sea levels. From 1961 to 2003, the
global average sea level rose at an average rate of 1.8 millimeter
per year, with an increased rate from 1993 to 2003.21
Projections for the next two decades indicate a warming of
approximately 0.2°C per decade.22 The best estimate for global
average surface warming for the end of the twenty-first century
(2090 - 2099) relative to 1980 to 1999 range from approximately
1.8°C (1.1°C to 2.9 0C) to 4.0°C (2.4°C to 6.4°C). 3 Even if
emissions were held constant at 2000-year levels, there would be a
warming trend of approximately 0.1 °C per decade.24 This trend is
15 Id. at 2.
16 Id. at 7-8.
17 Id. at 2.
18 Id. at 3.
19 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), CLIMATE CHANGE
2007 - IMPACTS, ADAPTION & VULNERABILITY, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO
THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE IPCC 88 (2007) [hereinafter IPCC GROUP II].
20 Id. at 7-8.
21 Robert L. Glicksman, Global Climate Change and the Risks to Coastal Areas
From Hurricanes and Rising Sea Levels: The Costs of Doing Nothing, 52 LOY. L. REV.
1127, 1199 n.41 (2006) (citing Stem Review: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, 7
(2006), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/Part I Introductiongroup.pdf.
22 William C. Bums, Global Warming - The United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change and the Future of Small Island States, 6 DICK. J. ENV. L.
POL. 147, 158 (1997) (citing Hadley Center for Climate Prediction and Research,
Modeling Climate Change: 1860-2050, 4 (Feb. 1995).
23 Edith Brown Weiss, Twentieth Anniversary Issue: Preface to the Twentieth
Anniversary Issue, 20 GEO. INT'L ENvTL. L. REV. 521, 524 (2008) (citing IPCC,
SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS OF THE SYNTHESIS REPORT OF THE IPCC FOURTH
ASSESSMENT REPORT § 3.4, table SPM.1. (Nov. 16, 2007), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syrspm.pdf.
24 Climate Change: Are Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Human Activities
Vol. XXXIV
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largely due to the slow feedback response of oceans. Projected
changes in the climate are likely to intensify shifts in precipitation
patterns, reduce snow cover area, increase glacial melt, and rapidly
increase the rate of sea level rise.
Given these trends, the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has indicated that greenhouse gas
concentrations must be stabilized at a level that avoids "dangerous
anthropogenic interference" with the climate system.25 Many
scientists have indicated that stabilization of atmospheric CO 2 at
450 ppm is necessary to avoid dangerous levels of global
26warming. More than 200 leading climate scientists issued a
declaration (the 2007 Bali Climate Declaration) to cut greenhouse
gas emission in half by 2050:
The next round of focused negotiations for a new
global climate treaty (within the 1992 UNFCCC
process) needs to begin in December 2007 and be
completed by 2009. The prime goal of this new
regime must be to limit global warming to no more
than 20C above the pre-industrial temperature, a
limit that has already been formally adopted by the
European Union and a number of other countries.
Based on current scientific understanding, this
requires that global greenhouse gas emissions need
to be reduced by at least 50% below their 1990
levels by the year 2050. In the long run, greenhouse
gas concentrations need to be stabilised at a level
well below 450 ppm (parts per million; measured in
CO 2e concentration). In order to stay below 2°C,
global emissions must peak and decline in the next
10 to 15 years, so there is no time to lose.27
Contributing to a Warming of the Planet?: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 110' Cong. 17 (2007) (statement of Dr. James W. Hurrell, Director, Climate
and Global Dynamics Div. Nat'l. Ctr. for Atmospheric Research) available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/cmte-mtgs/l 10-eaq-hrg.030707.Hurrell-Testimony
.pdf.
25 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, U.N GAOR
Intergov't Negotiating Comm., 5th Sess., U.N. Doc. FCCC/1992 (1992), reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 854 (1992)(entered into force Mar. 21, 1994), available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf.
26 Dan Galpern, Climate Change 101: Urgency and Response, 23 J. ENVTL. L. &
LIG. 191, 208 (2008).
27 In December of 2007, the Bali Convention (Conference of the Parties 13 or
2009
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The premise of the declaration is that greenhouse gas
concentrations above 450 ppm may dramatically change climate
systems. This could result in dangerous impacts on human health,
ecosystems, food production, and economic security.
II. Broad Policy Options
With scientific consensus that human activities have resulted
in dramatic and unprecedented changes to our climate, discussions
have shifted to consideration of the policy options available for
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. There are two types of broad
domestic policy options for controlling greenhouse gas emissions:
proscriptive instruments and economic instruments.
28
Proscriptive instruments, commonly referred to as the
"command-and-control" approach, have been widely employed to
address environmental problems to date.29  A proscriptive
approach can take the form of technology-based standards or
performance-based standards. 30  Technology-based standards
generally require a specific type of equipment, process, or
procedure. 3 1 In the case of climate change policy, technology-
based standards may require the creation of energy efficiency
standards for commercial and residential buildings, fuel economy
standards for vehicles, or technologies for landfill or livestock gas
collection. 32  Performance-based standards allow for more
flexibility than technology-based standards. 33 Performance-based
standards specify the desired level of pollution emissions and
allow the regulated entity to determine the technology or specific
method for achieving the emissions standard.34 For instance, a
COP-13) commenced the two-year process for an international agreement to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions after the Kyoto Protocol expires in 2012. During the
Convention, the 2007 Bali Climate Declaration was signed by over 200 scientists. See
Climate Change Research Centre at the University of New South Wales in Sydney,
Australia, 2007 Bali Climate Declaration by Scientists, 3-4, available at http://www
.ccrc.unsw.edu.au/news/2007/Bali.html.
28 See generally Robert N. Stavins, Policy Instruments for Climate Change: How
Can National Governments Address a Global Problem?, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 293
(1997).
29 Id.
30 Id. at 297-300.
31 Id. at 300.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Stavins, supra note 28, at 300.
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performance-based standard could mandate a firm's maximum
allowable level of CO 2 emissions to 1990 levels by 2020, while
allowing the firm to employ its preferred method or technology in
order to meet the standard.35
Proscriptive instruments36 are capable of achieving the desired
emissions reductions; however, they may be more costly to firms
and governmental or program administrators than alternative
approaches.37 Effective proscriptive instruments often require a
high level of information, such as sufficient knowledge of
available technologies, pollution control costs for firms, social
costs associated with the pollutants (e.g., health care costs), as well
as sufficient monitoring to verify that the standards are met.
Economic instruments are advocated as a cost-effective policy
38
approach to controlling greenhouse gas emissions. These
instruments place a monetary value on carbon, creating a financial
incentive for technology to change to low carbon solutions such as
renewable energy sources. These instruments also motivate
substituting lower emitting and energy-efficient products such as
compact florescent light bulbs and energy-efficient automobiles.
Assigning monetary value to carbon can also provide a source of
revenue for funding basic research and development, network
development (e.g., smart grid, transmission, and CCS pipelines),
and deployment from pilot projects to commercial scale projects.
Two market-based approaches have been debated as the most
appropriate method for correcting the emissions externality:
carbon taxes and cap-and-trade systems.39 The use of taxes versus
cap-and-trade programs to control emissions is largely a choice of
using a price-based approach or a quantity-based approach.
In the case of a carbon tax, the government would impose a
price on the quantity of CO 2 emitted. The tax would likely start
35 Kenneth C. Johnson, Commentary on "Recommendations for Designing a
Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade System for California," June 1, 2007 draft report (2007)
available at http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/events/2007-06-12_mac-meeting/publi
c_comments/Ken_ JohnsonComments_2007_06 05.pdf.
36 Stavins, supra note 28, at 300 (the term "proscriptive instruments" refers to
performance-based standards).
37 Id. at 300-02.
38 Id. at 312.
39 Robert R. Nordhaus & Kyle W. Danish, Assessing the Options for Designing a
Mandatory US. Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program, 32 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv. 97,
98 (2005).
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low and then rise steadily over time. Some economists favor a
carbon tax because it is perceived as a more predictable, long-term
price on emissions, encouraging carbon users to act accordingly. 40
Moreover, revenue generated through a carbon tax could offset
high energy bills and fuel prices for lower income households.
The higher costs of carbon-intensive actions associated with a
carbon tax will increase motivation to move towards low carbon
solutions. There is concern, however, that governments will
neither have sufficient information, nor the political capacity to set
the price at a level that would stabilize emissions.
In 1993, the Clinton administration proposed a broad-based
energy tax (BTU tax) to encourage conservation and reduce
41pollution in an economically and regionally equitable manner.
The proposed tax was to be directed towards producers, such as
refineries and transportation, and then passed on to consumers in
the form of higher prices.42 The tax level was to depend on the
carbon output, so that oil would be taxed more than natural gas;
renewable energy sources, including wind, solar, and geothermal,
would be exempt from the tax.43 The proposed BTU tax narrowly
passed in the House, but failed in the Senate, largely due to
widespread opposition within the business community, which
ultimately forced the Clinton administration to consider
44alternatives. Opponents indicate that if a carbon tax was
incorporated into legislation today it would face similar political
opposition as Clinton's BTU tax experienced in the early 1990s. 45
Cap-and-trade systems, on the other hand, are considered
politically favorable and may possess economic efficiency
advantages over a tax.46 These systems control the quantity of
40 See Gilbert E. Metcalf, Designing a Carbon Tax to Reduce U.S. Greenhouse Gas
Emissions, 3 REV. ENVTL. ECON & POL'Y 63, 63-83 (2009).
41 H.R. 2141, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (enacted).
42 Steven Greenhouse, Clinton's Economic Plan: The Energy Plan; Fuels Tax;
Spreading the Burden, N.Y. TTMEs, Feb. 17, 1993, at A18.
43 Id.
44 Id.; see also Paul Horvitz, Clinton Retreats on Energy Tax in Fight Over Budget,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 9, 1993 (stating possible changes to the energy tax).
45 See Kenneth P. Green et al., Climate Change: Caps vs. Taxes, ENVTL. POL'Y
OUTLOOK, 1, 4 (2007) ("Many economists believe a carbon tax.., would be a superior
policy alternative to an emissions-trading regime. The irony is that there is a broad
consensus in favor of a carbon tax everywhere but on Capitol Hill, where the 'T' word is
anathema.").
46 See generally Nathaniel 0. Keohane, Cap and Trade, Rehabilitated: Using
Tradable Permits to Control United States Greenhouse Gases, 3 REv. ENvTL. ECON. &
Vol. XXXIV
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47
emissions, allowing the market to determine the price.
Proponents indicate that a cap-and-trade approach allows science
to identify the level of emissions reduction necessary to achieve
climate stabilization.48 The cap is then set at that scientifically
sound level, ensuring the desired emissions reductions are
achieved. 49  At its core, a cap-and-trade program provides more
certain protection from environmental damage. In practice,
stabilizing greenhouse gas emissions is likely to be a mix of both
proscriptive and economic policy instruments, and may have a mix
of cap-and-trade and tax features, as recent legislation has
shown.
50
III. Cap-and-Trade: How it Works
A cap-and-trade system establishes a fixed quantity of
allowable emissions for a period of time. This fixed quantity is
referred to as the "cap" or emissions ceiling.51 The government
then distributes a limited number of tradable emissions
"allowances" (i.e., the right to emit) through an allocation or
auction system. 2 Entities that are required to meet the cap can
POL'Y. 42, 42 (2009) ("In the United States, cap and trade has been proposed for climate
policies at the state and regional levels, and as the U.S. Congress contemplates serious
action on climate change, cap and trade has been the centerpiece of every viable
legislative proposal."); Robert N. Stavins, A US. Cap-and-Trade System to Address
Global Climate Change, 55 (The Brookings Inst., Paper No. 2007-13, 2007) ("[A] tax
approach focuses political attention on prices, revenue, and costs, cap and trade
discussions tend to keep the focus on the environment.").
47 Brian C. Murray et al., Balancing Cost and Emissions Certainty: An Allowance
Reserve for Cap-and-Trade, 3 REv. ENvTL. ECON. & POL'Y. 84, 86 (2009).
48 See Stavins, supra note 46, at 7 ("The system should target all fossil fuel-related
C02 emissions through an economy-wide cap on those emissions . . . . The system
should set a trajectory of caps over time that begin modestly and gradually become more
stringent, establishing a long-run price signal to encourage investment in emission-
reducing technology.").
49 Id.
so See Lieberman-Warner's Climate Security Act § 2191, 101st Cong. (2007) ("The
Climate Security Act controls compliance costs by allowing companies to trade, save,
and borrow emission allowances, and by allowing them to generate allowances when
they induce non-covered businesses, farms, and others to reduce their greenhouse gas
emissions or capture and store greenhouse gases."); Bingaman-Specter "Low Carbon
Economy Act" of 2007, § 1766, 10 1st Cong. (2007) ("The Act creates a cap and trade
program for U.S. greenhouse gases .... The program is designed to elicit the most cost-
effective reductions across the economy. The target is set to avoid harm to the economic
and promote a gradual but decisive transition to new, lower-carbon technologies.").
5' Keohane, supra note 46, at 43.
52 Id.
2009
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choose to purchase or sell emissions allowances depending on
their pollution abatement costs and the market price of the
emissions allowance. 53  Those who can cut their emissions at a
lower cost than the allowance's market value will abate more and
purchase fewer (or sell extra) allowances, while entities that
cannot cut their emissions below the allowance's market value
will purchase more allowances. 54  Given that the aggregate
emissions target must be met, a cap-and-trade system provides the
incentive necessary for entities to meet their targets in a more cost-
effective manner.55
A. Cap-and-Trade Versus Command-and-Control
The efficiency gains of a cap-and-trade program have been
compared to proscriptive or "command-and-control" policy
56instruments. In a simplified two plant scenario for instance, a
proscriptive policy may require each plant to reduce emissions by
20% (e.g., reducing uncontrolled emissions of 500 tons CO 2e to
400 tons CO2e).57 If the two plants had different abatement costs
(e.g., $20.00 per ton of CO2e and $10.00 per ton of CO2e,
respectively) the total costs of the mandate would vary by plant.
Costs for Plant A would be $2,000.00 ($20.00 per ton of CO 2e
abated times the mandated emissions cut of 100 tons of CO2e),
while costs for Plant B would be $1,000.00 ($10.00 per ton of
CO 2e abatement costs times 100 CO2e mandated emissions cut).
In aggregate, a 20% emissions reduction, equal to 200 tons of
CO 2e emissions, would cost $3,000.00 with a proscriptive policy.
53 Id.
54 Id. ("[A] cap and trade program for [greenhouse gases] would allow firms to
bank allowances or even borrow them from future periods... equat[ing] the marginal
costs of abatement across time . . . [which] is crucial, since the damages from climate
change are driven by cumulative emissions of greenhouse gases over long periods of
time.").
55 Id. ("[I]n theory, cap-and-trade programs are cost-effective: they achieve the
required amount of emissions reduction at the lowest possible total abatement costs.").
56 Proscriptive or "command and control" policy instruments include technology
mandates and performance standards. See Lawrence H. Goulder & Ian W.H. Perry,
Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy 1-31 (Res. for the Future, Working Paper
No. 08-07, 2008) available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 1117566.
57 See Table 2, infra Part III.a.
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Table 2: Efficiency Gains of Cap-and-Trade Policy versus
Proscriptive Policy
Cost per ton Total CostPat Uncontrolled Mandated tordc frPlant Eisos 2%Ct to reduce forEmissions 20% Cut Emsin Madt
Emissions Mandate
A 500 400 $20 ($2,000)
B 500 400 $10 ($ 1,000)
Total 1,000 800 1 $15 ($3,000)
Proscriptive
Total Allowance
Emissions if Emission Transfer Net cost Efficiency
Plant Trading Reduction at price of after gains from
Allowed Cost after $15/ton trading Trade
Trading
A 500 $0 ($1,500) ($1,500) $500
B 300 ($2,000) $1,500 ($500) $500
800 ($2,000) $0 ($2000) $1000
Cap-and-Trade
A cap-and-trade policy would cap the total emissions at 800
tons of CO2 e, for the same 20% reduction. Plant A and B would
be subject to the cap. These capped entities would weigh their
plant's pollution abatement costs against the market price for
emissions allowances to determine the most cost-effective method
to meet the cap. The two plants could agree on an exchange price
for the allowances of $15 per ton of CO 2 e. In this scenario,
pollution abatement costs for Plant A ($20.00 per ton of CO2e) are
more expensive than the market price of allowances ($15). Plant
B, on the other hand, can abate pollution at a cheaper price ($10
per ton of CO2e) than the market price of allowances. As such,
Plant B will abate 200 tons of CO2e and sell its extra 100
emissions allowances (below its allotment of 400) to Plant A for
$15 per allowance. In aggregate, the cap-and-trade policy will
cost Plant A $1,500 (purchase of 100 emissions allowances at a
cost of $15 per allowance) and it will cost Plant B $500
(abatement of 200 tons of CO2e at a cost of $10 per ton minus the
sale of its 100 emission allowances at a value of $15 per
allowance). Overall, the cap-and-trade policy approach is more
efficient than the proscriptive approach at achieving the same
2009
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target. Both plants save $500 in the cap-and-trade program, with a
savings of $1,000 for the economy as a whole.
B. Cap-and-Trade: Historical Perspective
Cap-and-trade is not a new economic policy option. The
sulfur dioxide (SO 2) emissions trading system established under
Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act capped the amount of SO 2
emitted into the atmosphere at ten million tons less than 1980
levels, a fifty percent reduction, and established a trading system
that distributed allowance permits to electric power plants.5 The
SO2  emissions trading system has been considered
environmentally and economically successful.5 9  Targeted
emissions reductions have been achieved faster, and at lower costs
than they would have in the absence of a trading scheme. 60 This
success of the SO 2 emissions trading system has demonstrated that
market-based instruments can be cost-effective while achieving
environmental objectives. 61
Conceptions of cap-and-trade programs and environmental
markets have shifted; once considered pejoratively as "licenses to
pollute," these programs have had proven success at reducing
pollution economically. The market for CO 2 has grown primarily
through cap-and-trade programs. Domestically, the Chicago
Climate Exchange (CCX) and the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative (RGGI) have emerged as voluntary and mandatory cap-
and-trade programs.
" Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX). The CCX was
launched in 2003 as the first voluntary U.S. cap-and-trade
system. CCX is a multinational multi-sector market that
trades all six greenhouse gases.
62
" Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). RGGI is
the first mandatory U.S. cap-and-trade system for reducing
emissions from power plants. Ten states participate in
58 Clean Air Act (CAA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (2009); see also Robert N.
Stavins, What Can We Learn from the Grand Policy Experiment? Positive and
Normative Lessons from S02 Allowance Trading, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 69, 70 (1998).
59 Stavins, supra note 58, at 70.
6 id
61 Id.
62 Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) Overview (2008), http://www.chicagoclimate
x.com/about/pdf/CCXOverviewBrochure.pdf.
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RGGI: Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
Rhode Island, and Vermont. Pennsylvania, a large coal
state, is an observer to RGGI. Emissions trading permits
are auctioned quarterly; the first auction was held in
September of 2008. The first three-year compliance period
began in January, 2009. Proceeds of RGGI will be used to
promote renewable energy.
63
The Kyoto Protocol, a 1997 treaty to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that came
into force in 2005, developed an international CO2 cap-and-trade
system that legally bound signatory countries to reduce emissions
below 1990 levels.64  Developed to meet the targets set by the
Kyoto Protocol, the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme
(EU ETS) is the largest, multi-nation emissions trading system.65
Other signatory countries to the Kyoto Protocol have also begun to
implement CO2 emissions trading systems, including Australia and
New Zealand.66 The United States is not a signatory country and
therefore is not subject to the Protocol's commitments.67
IV. Role of Offsets
Climate change policy can be designed to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions (or increase carbon storage) in "uncapped" or
unregulated sectors of the economy, such as agriculture, forestry,
landfills, and livestock.68  In a cap-and-trade system, uncapped
entities may be able to voluntarily reduce their emissions (or
increase carbon storage) to offset the emissions of another entity
63 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) C02 Budget Trading Program,
http://www.rggi.org (last visited Mar. 25, 2009).
64 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
65 See Denny Ellerman & Barbara K. Buchner, The European Union Emissions
Trading Scheme: Origins, Allocation, and Early Results, 1 OXFORD REv. ENvT'L. ECON.
& POL'Y 66, 67 (2007) (discussing that the EU ETS is clearly motivated by the Kyoto
Protocol).
66 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 64.
67 See Arjun Ponnambalam, U.S. Climate Change Legislation and the Use of GATT
Article XX to Justify a "Competitiveness Provision" in the Wake of Brazil-Tyres, 40
GEO. J. INT'L. L. 261, 286 (2008) (discussing U.S. refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol).
68 Brian Murray, Emissions Offsets in a Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade Policy,
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, Nov. 17, 2008, http://www.rff.org/Publications/WPC/
Pages/l 1 708 EmissionsOffset.aspx.
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covered by the cap. An offset is the agreement by two entities in
which the uncapped entity agrees to reduce emissions in exchange
for payment by the capped entity.69 The transaction would only
take place if the seller can cut emissions less expensively than the
buyer. The seller will do so if they are paid more than the cost of
the emissions reduction activity.
For example, a cap may be set at 200,000 tons of CO 2e, with
each capped entity trying to achieve an emissions target of
100,000 tons of CO 2 e.7° Each capped entity will determine the
most cost effective means to meet its emissions target, including
reducing emissions through investments in better technology,
trading of emissions allowances, and/or purchasing offset credits.
If a capped entity (e.g., Plant B) can acquire 5,000 tons of offsets
from a forestry or agricultural sequestration project (e.g., Farm Y)
less expensively than it can reduce 5,000 tons itself, it will
purchase the offsets. This allows Plant B to emit 105,000 tons of
CO2e, while still achieving net emissions of 100,000 tons of CO 2e(105,000 emission tons less 5,000 sequestration tons). This offset
allows capped entities to cost-effectively meet the total cap of
200,000 tons of CO2e without compromising the environmental
integrity of the cap.
Figure 2: Meeting the Cap of 200,000 ton of CO 2e Through the
Use of Offsets
Cap = 200,000 tons/yr CO2
69 Id.
70 See Table 2, infra Part III.a.
71 Figure 2 was created by the author. The figure is derived from numeric figures
used in the preceding paragraph.
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To date, key international and domestic cap-and-trade policies
have included emissions offset provisions.72  The Clean
Development Mechanisms (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol
allowed signatory countries to meet their targets using emissions
reduction credits generated through offsets projects in developing
countries not bound to Kyoto targets, in addition to using internal
emissions reductions and trading credits with other signatory
countries.73 Domestically, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI) has included an offset provision in its cap-and-trade
program. 74 The Lieberman-Warner America's Climate Security
Act of 2008 proposed to cut emissions by seventy percent from
2005 levels by 2050, with domestic and international offsets as a
significant component of the policy's cost-containment design.75
Although the bill did not pass, it did provide the foundation for
offset provisions in future climate change legislation.
Offsets can provide a number of benefits to both capped and
uncapped entities. For instance, offsets can increase the flexibility
of a cap-and-trade system by allowing new sectors to enter the
market and can reduce the costs of meeting the cap. Offsets can
also stimulate parts of the economy, delivering needed resources
and efficient technologies to sectors and countries outside of the
cap that are economically disadvantaged. Furthermore, offsets
projects can be mutually beneficial for environmental and social
purposes. For instance, a forestry project that increases carbons
storage by planting trees may also increase habitats for endangered
or threatened wildlife species, create recreational opportunities for
the public, and/or improve water quality for downstream users.
Although offsets can provide a number of economic,
environmental, and social benefits, there are a number of critical
72 See Murray, supra note 68.
73 Jacob D. Werksman, Defending the "Legitimate Expectations" of Private
Investors Under the Climate Change Regime: In Search of a Legal Theory for Redress,
39 GEO. J. INT'L L. 679, 679 (2008).
74 See Patrick Parenteau, Lead, Follow, or Get Out of the Way: The States Tackle
Climate Change with Little Help from Washington, 40 CONN. L. REv. 1453, 1465 (2008)
(discussing how all states are now requiring carbon offsets).
75 See Lydia Olander et al., Developing Offset Policy in the US (Nicholas Inst. for
Envtl. Pol'y. Solutions, Report NI R 08-01 May 2008), available at
http://www.nicholas.duke.edu/institute/offsetspolicy.pdf (discussing that under the
Lieberman-Warner bill (section 2191), fifteen percent of a capped entities' emissions
obligations can be meet with domestic offsets and fifteen percent can be meet with
international offsets, allowing a capped entity to meet thirty percent of their total
emissions with domestic and international offsets).
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issues in ensuring the environmental integrity of the offset policy.
Specific concerns include additionality, leakage, and permanence.
" Additionality is a necessary condition for offsets to
perform their intended role. Offset projects must result in
an overall reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, which
would not have occurred without the offset project (i.e., the
baseline). Baselines for offset projects are unobservable
counterfactuals, calling into question the validity of using
offsets in a mandatory cap-and-trade program.
Additionality tests have been used to ensure emissions
reductions are below (or above for carbon sequestration)
the baseline.76 For instance, under the legal or regulatory
additionality test, if the project is better than the action
required by law or regulation, it is considered additional
and, therefore, a valid offset project." Under financial
additionality, the project activity would be unprofitable
without project finances and presumably would not be
carried out as part of normal business practices. Some
additionality tests work off industry performance
standards, with any emissions performance better than the
industry deemed additional and creditable.
" Leakage occurs when emissions reductions from an offset
project results in activities that increase emissions from a
source not governed by the cap or offset program, thereby
counteracting the project's emissions reductions.78
" Permanence is associated with offsets generated from
biological sequestration of carbon in agricultural and
forestry projects. 79  Forestry and agricultural soil are
subject to a loss of sequestered carbon from natural
disturbances such as fires, wind, and disease or pest
outbreak, or intentional management actions such as
cutting down forests or reversing agricultural management
76 See Mark C. Trexler et al., A Statistically-Driven Approach to Offset-Based
GHG Additionality Determinations: What Can We Learn?, 6 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. &
POL'Y. 30, 31 (2006) (discussing that the additionality tests are designed to see whether
the reductions are additional to the reductions that would have occurred even in the
absence of an emissions trading system).
77 Id.
78 Murray, supra note 47.
79 Id.
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practices from conservation or no-till to conventional
tillage. Mechanisms can be used to reduce the risk
associated with the reversal of permanence. 80 For instance,
the Clean Development Mechanism requires all biological
sequestration projects to use temporary credits (i.e., credits
that represent the finite carbon storage of biological
sources and assign liability to the appropriate party) instead
of risking impermanence. Other approaches include the
establishment of risk buffers and insurance.
Additionality, leakage, and permanence are valid concerns.
However, well-designed and properly implemented offset
protocols can reduce the costs associated with meeting the cap and
ensure the system's integrity.
V. Policy Outlook for the United States
Climate change policy is moving quickly. Domestic action is
well underway at the state and regional level. A number of
voluntary and mandatory cap-and-trade programs are now trading
emissions allowances. 81 At the federal level, there is more than
five years worth of momentum on cap-and-trade proposals,
starting with action in the Senate, including the McCain-
Lieberman bill (section 139) that was introduced and voted down
in 2003, the Bingaman-Specter bill (section 1766) that was
proposed in 2007, and the Boxer-Lieberman-Warner bill (section
3036) that was proposed, introduced to the Senate, then withdrawn
prior to a full vote in mid 2008.82 Toward the end of 2008, the co-
chairman of the House Energy and Commerce committee,
Representatives Dingell and Boucher circulated a draft cap-and-
80 See Brian C. Murray & Lydia P. Olander, Addressing Impermanence Risk and
Liability in Agriculture, Land Use Change, and Forest Carbon Projects (Nicholas Inst.
for Envtl. Pol'y Solutions, Policy Brief NI PB 08-01C, Oct. 2008), available at
www.nicholas.duke.edu/institute/offsetseries3.pdf.
81 See Stephanie L. Wilson, Dog Days of Climate Change: Heating the Debate for
Federal Cap-and-Trade, 28 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENvT'L. L. 163, 166-69 (2008)
(discussing EPA's Acid Rain Program, Regional Ozone Program, and the self-regulated
Chicago Climate Exchange Program).
82 See Climate Stewardship Act of 2003, § 139, 108th Cong. (2003) (proposing an
economy-wide GHG cap-and-trade program); Low Carbon Economy Act of 2007, §
1766, 1 10th Cong. (2007) (proposing an economy-wide mandatory tradable-permits
system that is designed to most cost-effectively reduce carbon emissions); Boxer-
Lieberman-Wamer Climate Security Act Substitute Amendment, § 3036, 110th Cong.
(2008) (setting a declining cap on U.S. emissions of greenhouse gases).
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trade for discussion.83 These various initiatives are in somewhat
of a holding pattern at the time of this writing, because of changes
in the composition of both houses of Congress following the 2008
elections.
The incoming Obama administration has pledged to enact a
federal cap-and-trade system that will reduce emissions to 1990
levels by 2020 and reduce them an additional eighty percent by
2050.85  It has indicated interest in reinvigorating international
engagement, which is likely to be built around a cap-and-trade
system. As such, it appears at the time this paper was written that
a cap-and-trade system will remain the dominant approach to
tackling climate change.
Although political momentum has been growing, the economic
crisis of 2008 has caused some concern regarding the large
economic undertaking of climate change.86 In light of the collapse
of securitized asset markets globally, this crisis has also raised
questions about the creation of an entirely new market in
greenhouse allowances that are tradable, risky and complex.
Some have renewed the debate about a carbon tax as an alternative
to cap-and-trade.
87
A. Sticking Points in Climate Change Policy
There are currently a number of issues that must be solved
before a carbon emissions trading program can be adopted and
implemented, including:
83 See Barbara Hendrickson, Change You Can Believe In? The President-Elect's
Plan and Congressional Climate Change Proposals, MONDAQ BUS. BRIEFINGS, Dec. 17,
2008, at 1 (discussing the Dingell-Boucher proposal that establishes an economy-wide
cap-and-trade regime for controlling U.S. greenhouse gas emissions).
84 See Pub. L. No. 110-430, 122 Stat. 4846 (2008) (stating the first regular session
of the 111 th congress shall begin on January 6, 2009).
85 See Liz Sidoti, Obama Promises Leadership on Climate Change, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Nov. 18, 2008.
86 See, e.g., John M. Broder, Geography Is Dividing Democrats Over Energy,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2009, at A1; Jim Tankersley, Obama Still Plans to Cut Emissions;
A Cap-and-Trade Initiative Would Limit Greenhouse Gases-Some Fear, at the
Economy's Expense, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2009, at A11.
87 See interviewing of economist Gilbert Metcalf favoring a carbon tax in part due
to the financial market difficulties, David Rotman, Gilbert Metcalf A Leading
Economist Explains Why a Carbon Tax Is The Best Strategy for Cutting Greenhouse
Gases and The Use of Fossil Fuels, TECH. REV., Jan.-Feb. 2009.
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" Cap stringency. Policy-makers must determine the
appropriate level at which to set the emissions cap.
88
* Scope. Policy-makers must decide the breadth of a cap-
and-trade system to address U.S. greenhouse gas
emissions. Programs may cover all sectors of the
economy, the main emitting sectors (e.g., electric power,
transportation, and industrial sources), or perhaps
stationary sources at the beginning of the program. Trade-
offs in broad coverage, ease of administration, and the
measurability of emissions must be considered in
determining the scope of the cap-and-trade system.
* Allowance allocation procedures. Allowances may be
allocated freely to regulated entities or may be auctioned.
Both approaches provide a monetary incentive to reduce
emissions and do not adversely affect the environmental
integrity of the cap. Allocating allowances without charge
is seen by some as politically advantageous because
allowances can be distributed directly to parties likely to be
most negatively affected (e.g., high emitting sectors, those
at a globally competitive disadvantage, low income
households facing higher energy bills, etc.). Auctioning
allowances, on the other hand, yields revenue that may be
used for these same purposes or to publicly finance the
development of low-carbon technologies necessary to meet
the long-term challenges.
89
" International engagement. Because climate change is a
global problem a global solution is needed. There is a
compelling case for the United States, as one of the
world's largest emitters, to take a strong leadership role.
Another large emitter, China, does not appear poised to
accept binding GHG restrictions in the near future.
Therefore, some sort of framework or series of side
agreements will likely be necessary to ensure that U.S.
88 See, e.g., Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful US. Cap-and-Trade System to
Address Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 293 (2008) (discussing the impacts
of policies that gradually increase cap stringency).
89 Maxine Burkett, Just Solutions to Climate Change: A Climate Justice Proposal
for a Domestic Clean Development Mechanism, 56 BUFF. L. REv. 169, 216 (2008)
(referring to the process of auctioning allowances as "progressive revenue recycling").
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efforts are matched ultimately by other major emitters of
the world, including China.
90
* Cost-containment provisions. One of the consequences
of a cap-and-trade program is that the carbon price is
unknown in advance. Due to concerns about the
possibility of extremely high and volatile carbon prices,
various legislative provisions have been proposed, ranging
from capping prices at a fixed level (a "safety valve") or
introducing new allowances into the market from a carbon
reserve account.
9 1
o Market transparency. A cap-and-trade-driven carbon
market could have transaction value in the hundreds of
billions of dollars. Because this market is being created by
government fiat, and especially due to the financial
market's meltdown starting in 2008, it is particularly
important that the carbon market be subject to strict rules
and oversight in order to ensure transparency, efficiency,
and equity.
92
o Transitioning from state to federal mandates. Congress
is considering various state and regional greenhouse gas
initiatives as foundational proposals for greenhouse cap-
and-trade legislation. Federal climate policy will need to
specify the role of states and regions in a national cap-and-
trade program, including whether or not state and federal
mandates can coexist and how this impacts the distribution
of emissions allowances issued at the state and federal
level.93
In addition to a cap-and-trade system, there is a need to
consider additional policies that reduce greenhouse gas emissions
90 See ARCHITECTURES FOR AGREEMENT: ADDRESSING GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IN
THE POST-KYOTO WORLD 107 (Joseph E. Aldy & Robert N. Stavins eds., Cambridge
University Press 2007) (observing the need for both U.S. and Chinese cooperation in
future attempts to limit GHG emissions).
91 See Murray et al., supra note 47, for a review of various cost containment
options.
92 Jillian Button, Carbon: Commodity or Currency? The Case for an International
Carbon Market Based on the Currency Model, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 571, 581 (2008)
(observing that "the underlying economic justification for emissions trading brings into
relief the importance of optimal regulatory design. A poorly designed system will lead to
inefficiency, potentially cancelling out any potential cost-reduction goals.").
93 See Jonas Monast, Integrating State, Regional, and Federal Greenhouse Gas
Markets: Options and Tradeoffs, 18 DUKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 329, 346 (2008).
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that can either supplement cap-and-trade by addressing uncapped
sectors or complement cap-and-trade by expanding technologies
deployed in capped sectors. Funding for complementary policies
is a key policy question. An economic policy approach, such as a
cap-and-trade program, may provide revenue that can be used to
fund complementary policies. These policies include:
" Carbon capture and sequestration (CCS). Carbon
capture and sequestration is the mitigation of emissions
through capturing CO 2 from large emitting point sources
and permanently storing the CO 2 in geological formations
(i.e., depleted oil and gas reservoirs and deep aquifers).94
The cost of capture and geological storage of CO2 varies
by technology and location and remains highly uncertain.
95
But given the nation's relative abundance of coal, the costs
of CCS may be economically viable in the United States
under a cap-and-trade program that prices carbon if the
capacity for moving and storing CO2 can be developed in
an economic manner.
" Research and development (R&D). Research and
Development on technologies and policy options that result
in reduced greenhouse gas emissions.
" Technology transfer to developing countries.
International participation in greenhouse gas mitigation is
required to limit global climate change; however,
developing countries often do not have the technological
resources needed to make the necessary technological
changes. 96  International and domestic policies must be
established to transfer technologies to rapidly growing
countries.
94 See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, CARBON SEQUESTRATION RESEARCH, CARBON
CAPTURE RESEARCH, http://fossil.energy.gov/programs/sequestration /capture/index.html
(last visited Mar. 25, 2008).
95 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Costs and Economic
Potential, in IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON CARBON DIOXIDE CAPTURE AND STORAGE, 345-48
(Bert Metz et al. eds., Cambridge University Press 2005) (examining costs of geological
storage).
96 See Lorelyn Hall, Technology Transfers Under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 59, 62 (2005)
(emphasizing the need for technology transfers from developed to developing countries
in order to combat climate change).
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VI. Conclusion
Global warming can severely change the climate system.
Shifts in precipitation patterns, melting of snow caps and glaciers,
and rising sea levels create an urgent need for a comprehensive
climate change policy. In the United States, a federal cap-and-
trade system has emerged as the most politically viable approach,
which if designed correctly, can cost-effectively achieving the
desired emissions reductions. 97 To date, cap-and-trade programs
have been under development at the regional and state level, and
the U.S. Congress has considered proposals for federal cap-and-
trade legislation. With the incoming Obama administration,
momentum for a federal cap-and-trade system has increased. 99
Nevertheless, the adoption and implementation of a federal cap-
and-trade system must be carefully developed. Resolutions must
come in the form of offset provisions, increased cost containment
mechanisms, transitioning the state and regional cap-and-trade
systems to a federal system, and engaging the international system
to assist in the process. By considering complementary policies
such as CCS development, R&D, and technology transfers to
developing countries, Congress and the Obama administration can
produce a federal cap-and-trade system that is efficient, flexible
and integrated with global efforts to mitigate climate change.
97 See James Ruhl, Quicksilver Alchemy: New England's Mercury Control
Programs and the Clean Air Mercury Rule, 32 VT. L. REv. 525, 539 (2008) (arguing that
"Cap-and-trade programs' greatest contribution to the cause of environmental protection
is political, not regulatory . . . . [Mjarket based control regimes may be the only
politically viable mechanism to reduce pollution.").
98 See PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, ECONOMY-WIDE CAP & TRADE
PROPOSALS IN THE I10TH CONGRESS (Dec. 1, 2008), http://www.pewclimate.org/
doc/Chart-and-Graph- 120108.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2009).
99 See Sidoti, supra note 85 (reporting President Obama's support for a cap-and-
trade approach during a video message to attendees of the 2008 Governors' Global
Climate Summit).
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